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Rabbinic literature of Late Antiquity encompasses legal and exegetical texts. Whereas legal texts delineate criminal procedures to determine a guilty party and advise appropriate punishment, exegetical texts suggest an almost entirely indeterminate and indeterminable understanding of guilt. This chapter examines rabbinic interpretations of the paradigmatic biblical story of guilt, Cain's murder of his brother Abel, in which Cain's guilt is mitigated and the stable relationship between evidence and guilt is challenged. I argue that these conflicting views of guilt in early rabbinic thought need not be harmonized – that a legal understanding of determinate guilt need not require a philosophical, or theological, counterpart.

Nietzsche's and Freud's views of guilt provide a useful theoretical context for understanding the relationship between guilt and Utopia we have outlined in Utopia and Those Who Walk Away From Omelas. Both of them speak of guilt as the internalization of cruelty or the instinct of aggression, and see it as an inward turn that reflects a historical context. Nietzsche views guilt and “bad conscience” as a kind of illness. In The Genealogy of Morals (1887/trans. 1989) he writes, “[I] regard the bad conscience as the serious illness that man was bound to contract under the stress of the most fundamental change he ever experienced – that change which occurred when he found himself finally enclosed within the wall of society and of peace” (Nietzsche, 1989, p. 84). In Nietzsche's view, when faced with peace (the absence of an enemy upon whom one might inflict cruelty) and social mores (proscriptions against being cruel to one's fellow citizen) a civilized human is left with only one subject upon whom he may express his aggression and satisfy his appetite for cruelty: himself. “[He] turns himself into an adventure, a torture chamber, an uncertain and dangerous wilderness” (Nietzsche, 1989, p. 85). Deprived of the possibility of expressing his aggressiveness externally, man turns inward and expresses it internally, upon himself. Thus begins the age – and for Nietzsche it is our age – of “man's suffering of man, of himself” (Nietzsche, 1989, p. 85).

Faraoyść is a translinguistic portmanteau neologism that describes the moment when oppressive systems are shaken and appear to be coming to an end, and joyful, liberated worlds feel within reach. The purpose of this research is to demonstrate that faraoyść helped participants helped participants to expand their situated imaginings, which increased their capacity to imagine decolonized worlds.

This research was guided by faraoyść as a conceptual framework that explores the empirical experience of joy through collaborative world-building activities. These praxis-based exercises were tested in a series of workshops both at the 2020 UNESCO Futures Literacy Summit and in collaboration with Negligence Refugees from Lebanon.

When activated by collaboratively designed speculative objects and stories generated through the lens of faraoyść, participants created spaces of rhizomatic world-building that allowed them to imagine beyond the boundaries of their situated imaginings. Once participants had mapped the ways their imaginations were limited by current colonial systems of power, they were able to reorient their roles and develop new means to act within decolonized systems.

Faraoyść is a novel conceptual framework that contributes to current movements to decolonize futuring and foresight. This paper also introduces the concepts of rhizomatic world-building – an emergent approach to co-imagination, and situated imaginings, which are the systemic frameworks within which one imagines the ways the world has, is, will and must work. In practice, faraoyść is grounded in abundance and the power of liberatory joy to strengthen and celebrate local traditions, storytelling, world-building and community power.